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TOWARDS A SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF LAW:
SOME LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXISTENTIALISM
This is not meant for any pulpit, not for
men to chant or tell their children. Not beau-
tiful enough.
But perhaps this can suggest a passion.
Perhaps this passion could be brought to clarify,
make more radiant, the standing Law.
Leonard Cohen*
Whenever any important thinker or school gives us a new con-
ception of man or society, it is the duty of the legal community to
consider it. Freud, Darwin, Marx and Durkheim have all had an impact
upon the law-for better or worse-and have been assimilated in some
way into the body of law. Whether the new theory is accepted or not
is unimportant; but if we ignore it completely we isolate the law from
reality and place it in danger of becoming desiccated and dogmatic.
The stream of thought that Roscoe Pound introduced into American
law must be kept alive, not as a monument to his memory, but as an
obligation to ourselves-as long as "justice" remains the ideal. In a
rare article' entitled The Importance of Being: Some Reflections on
Existentialism in Relation to Law,2 Anthony Blackshield has written:
In continental philosophy, existentialism is of course by far the most
pervasive contemporary influence; it is almost the matrix of modem
continental philosophic thought, in a far more basic and radical sense
than, for instance, linguistic philosophy in England. Even for those
contemporary continental philosophers who are not existentialists (and
of course there are many), existentialism is part of the philosophic air
they breathe. There can be no adequate understanding of modem
continental philosophy without a thorough understanding of existen-
tialism. This extends to the work of continental legal philosophers as
well; and in this respect as in many others, the important legal-philo-
sophical work now being done in Latin-American countries shares
the continental character. 3
* From Lines from my Grandfather's Journal, in THE SPICE-Box OF EARTH 79
(paper ed. 1971).
1. Writings dealing with existentialism and the law are less rare outside of the
Anglo-American community. Anthony Blackshield cites Werner Maihofer, Erich Fechner,
Ulrich Hommes and Georg Cohn among others as having made use of existentialism in
their legal writings. The only work translated into English and accessible to this author
was G. COHN, EXISTENTIALISM AND LEGAL SCIENCE (1967).
2. 10 NATuRALL.F. 67 (1965).
3. Id. at 69.
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Since existentialism has also made an impression upon various areas
of American life, such as literature, education and psychiatry, the fact
that it has not been written about by legal scholars in this country
seems paradoxical. If existentialism has been left on the shelf in our
(super) market of ideas, one may assume that either the product is
faulty or the market is sluggish.
INTRODUCTION
Existentialism, like marriage, has made some strange (and even-
tually unwilling) bedfellows. A collection of existentialist writings,
such as Walter Kaufmann's, 4 may include highly religious Protestants,
Catholics, atheists (and anti-religionists) as well as former Nazis and
Communists. If placed in a single room for eternity their conversation
would probably resemble a scene from No Exit; in any case they would
not get along. However, when listened to in their most individual voices
(often in the finest literary styles) they lead us on a frequently agoniz-
ing search into the nature of man's being in order to reawaken us to
"authentic" existence. Concerning the development of this philoso-
phy Karl Jaspers has written:
Quietly, something enormous has happened in the reality of Western
man: a destruction of all authority, a radical disillusionment in an
over-confident reason, and a dissolution of bonds have made anything,
absolutely anything, seem possible.... Philosophizing to be authentic
must grow out of our new reality, and there take its stand.6
In their struggle to make us strip away all illusions and self-deception,
to accept our freedom and responsibility and drive us out of all the
havens of weakness provided by deterministic theories, they raise ques-
tions of importance to each of us as individuals, and most especially, as
lawyers and judges. This paper represents an attempt, not to reconcile
the views of these philosophers, but merely to glean a few ideas from
various existentialist thinkers and consider their application to the
American legal system. If "the structural framework of their philoso-
phy is such that it positively demands to be filled with a content drawn
from the personal idiosyncrasies and outlook of each thinker who em-
ploys it," then this paper may be thought of as the excusable "idio-
4. W. KAUFMANN, EXISTENTIALISM FROM DoSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE (1956).
5. K. JASPERS, REASON AND EXISTENZ 23 (1955).
6. Blackshield, supra note 2, at 72.
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syncrasy" of one who is neither a lawyer nor philosopher, but is merely
trying to fill a vacuum.
I. THE SHUDDER BEFORE JUDGMENT
Any discussion of existentialism should begin with Soren Kierke-
gaard, who in seeking to revitalize Christianity created a "new total
intellectual attitude for men"7 which has profoundly influenced even
those who have no interest or sympathy for any religion. In the first half
of the nineteenth century he saw technology creating too many phys-
ical comforts and the individual complacently allowing himself to be
swallowed up by the "crowd." Therefore, he ironically stated that his
task was "to create difficulties everywhere." 8 In his attack upon sci-
ence he was not lamenting the idyllic village that industrialism had
left deserted, but was seeking to warn us that there are limits to
rational thought, that human existence cannot be reduced to a simple
scientific formula or a closed Hegelian system. His "subjectivity" is
sometimes misunderstood as a collapse into irrationalism,9 but is more
correctly placed into perspective in this analysis by John Wild:
[Kierkegaard's] method of dealing with these data [phenomena of inner
existence] is eminently objective and rational. He is simply trying to
describe them without distortion, precisely as they are given.... He
is a great phenomenologist, analyzing confused regions of personal
existence with penetrating clarity, and revealing their necessary
connections with one another. Far from being a lapse into subjective
bias and irrationalism, his philosophical work is a triumph of rational
description and analysis, an original penetration of reason into deeps
of experience long languishing in the dark obscurity of the obvious.10
Although Friedrich Nietzsche was a scathing opponent of the
Christianity which was Kierkegaard's sole obsession, the two thinkers
are often treated together, as in Jaspers' famous lecture where he stated
7. K. JASPERS, supra note 5, at 25.
8. Kierkegaard, On His Mission, in W. KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 85.
9.
Instead of asking whether Descartes' fine ideal that our reasoning should be
clear and distinct, reinforced since by the tremendous progress of the sciences,
might not eventually lead philosophers to concentrate on logic and trivialities
to the neglect of large and certainly important areas, Kierkegaard renounced
clear and distinct thinking altogether.
W. KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 18.
10. Wild, Kierkegaard and Contemporary Existentialist Philosophy, in A KIERKE-
GAARD CRITIQUE [hereinafter cited as CRITIQUE] 25 (H. Johnson & N. Thulstrup eds.
1962).
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that "[b]oth are irreplaceable, as having dared to be shipwrecked."' 1
Kierkegaard would probably have agreed with Nietzsche's contention
that "men are inclined to laziness," that "[t]hey hide behind customs
and opinions . . . and what they fear most is the trouble with which
any unconditional honesty and nudity will burden them."'12 The Danish
thinker feared that this laziness would cause people to allow the
"crowd" or the state to make their ethical decisions for them, and his
mission was to make people aware of their freedom and the necesssity
of making their own choices. At times one is almost led to believe that
his condemnation of the "crowd" betrays a touch of the misanthrope.
However, by attributing the greatness of Socrates to the fact that when
standing accused before the assembled citizens of Athens the great
philosopher "did not see masses, but only individuals,"'1 Kierkegaard
reveals that his main concern is for each individual in the "crowd."
Kierkegaard's attacks upon speculative philosophy in general, and
Hegel in particular, are especially applicable to legal theory. Hegel's
system, he writes, is bound to fail because it tries to introduce move-
ment into logic-"a sheer confusion of logical science."' 4 Since an
individual is always in the process of "existing" or "becoming," he
cannot find answers to ethical (or we may add, legal) questions in
any closed system which develops out of logic or history. History pro-
vides no dependable answers to our problems because our understand-
ing of the past can never be complete. Even if a value were correct at
one point in time, it may no longer be correct in face of the unique
situation confronting us. Custom and tradition-"the inertia of his-
tory"-hold no value for Kierkegaard since an individual's decision
in similar circumstances the day before may no longer be correct for
him. The subjective individual is always aware of the ethical because
neither history nor science can govern his decision. A philosophy is
11. K. JASPERS, supra note 5, at 38.
12. Nietzsche, The Challenge of Every Great Philosophy, in W. KAUFMANN, supra
note 4, at 101.
13. CRITIQUE, supra note 10, at 72. While Kierkegaard attacked the "crowd," he
was not highly enthusiastic about the aristocracy either.
"The masses": that is really the aim of my polemic; and I learned that from
Socrates. I wish to make people aware, so that they do not squander and dis-
sipate their lives. The aristocrats assume that there is always a mass of lost
men. But they hide the fact, they live withdrawn and behave as though these
many, many men did not exist. That is what is godless in the superiority of
the aristocrats; in order to have things their own way they do not even make
people aware.
Quoted in CRTIQUE, supra note 10, at 57.
14. S. KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT 99 (1941).
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only valuable to Kierkegaard to the extent that it is lived. He even
recommends that the scientist "acquire an ethical understanding of
himself before he devotes himself to scholarship, and that he should
continue to understand himself ethically while immersed in his labors;
because the ethical is the very breath of the eternal, and constitutes
even in solitude the reconciling fellowship with all men." 15 This strikes
a highly responsive chord at a time when scientists and universities
are being forced to consider the morality of their endeavors. If the
idea of "pure" research can no longer excuse the chemist developing
new weapons for the government, can a judge applying an oppressive
statute escape responsibility beneath a "pure theory of law"? This
question will be discussed at a later point of this paper.
In Existentialism and Legal Science16 Georg Cohn tries to incorpo-
rate many of Kierkegaard's basic ideas into legal analysis. He stresses
the unpredictability of reality and the fact that general principles can-
not decide a concrete, singular case. Following Kierkegaard's distrust
of history and logic to provide a solution to our problems, he rejects
stare decisis, which views the present conflict as having been solved by
an earlier decision. First, we are faced with the possibility that the
earlier decision was wrong; even if correct, it merely states what the
law was at that time and place. Since the precedent is of no greater
value than the decision being made now, it is only of historical in-
terest and deserves no binding force. While the traditional view sees
the case as decided before the conflict even arises, the existential
approach considers the instant case as something that is alive and con-
crete and worthy of fresh consideration.
When one considers how often the laws of our times have their origin
in entirely unjust political power relations so that in many cases their
application amounts to a flagrant interference with the justified
interests of the citizen, one can well understand how senseless and
purposeless an effect the propping up of time-worn political power
structures has on modem legal relations. 17
Thus, we may paraphrase Edmund Burke's famous remark to say
that Anglo-American law represents the outgrowth of that process
which allows the dead of the past to gain a stranglehold upon genera-
15. Id. at 135-36.
16. G. CoHN, supra note 1.
17. Id. at 30.
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tions yet unborn.'8 In this respect the existential view is very similar
to the homegrown rule of pragmatism that each precedent should
be subjected to a scientific test with every new case and eliminated
when it is no longer of value. The difference between pragmatism
and existentialism on this point is that the former views science as
holding the solution to all problems, including ethical. 19 As the title
of one of Kierkegaard's great works, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
indicates, the Danish philosopher was clearly disenchanted with scien-
tific revelations.
The existential approach can also be distinguished from that of
Karl Llewellyn's school of legal realism, which draws a dichotomy
between the treatment of "good" and "bad" precedents. 20 The prece-
dents that the judge thinks are legitimate or honorable are maintained
with full force, while those that the judge frowns upon are interpreted
strictly and are whittled away. The major quarrel an existentialist
may take with this position is that it is dishonest; it pretends to
follow authorities while in practice the courts are really deciding each
case anew. Karl Friedrich's statement concerning legal fictions that
"'life is but a dream,' and even fictions have their place in the econ-
omy of the mind, especially the legal mind"21 violates the necessity for
openness and honesty, which is so basic to many of the existentialist
thinkers. Even if it is true that judges receive more criticism for openly
rejecting bad precedents than for pretending to follow them, it is bet-
ter to suffer that instant of pain-as when an open wound is cleansed
-than to allow it to fester beneath the surface of a secretive legal
methodology.
The thought of Karl Jaspers, the existential philosopher of com-
18. Edmund Burke was the "English orator and traditionalist to whom all was
sacred that bore the imprint of time, even the poorhouse and rotten borough." Friedrich,
Introduction to The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings
vii (C. Friedrich ed. 1949).
19. John Dewey reverses Kierkegaard's advice that the scientist study ethics and
recommends that the ethicist study science:
Inquiry, discovery take the same place in morals that they have come to occupy
in sciences of nature. Validation, demonstration become experimental, a matter
of consequences. Reason, always an honorific term in ethics, becomes actualized
in the methods by which the needs and conditions, the obstacles and resources,
of situations are scrutinized in detail, and intelligent plans of improvement are
worked out.
J. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 174 (paper ed. 1963).
20. C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 271
(paper ed. 1958).
21. Id. at 260.
'COMMENTS'
munication, might also lead us to reject stare decisis, but for quite
different reasons. His concept of tragedy is of particular relevance to
legal theory. The atmosphere of humaneness he finds in great tragedy
results from the personal involvement of the members of the audience,
who experience catharsis by moving inside the characters of the drama
and experiencing their fate.22 In this way, "we transcend misery and
terror and so move toward essential reality."' ' However, the force of
the tragedy is lost if we allow ourselves to feel mere sympathy for the
characters and remain remote from them as if we had escaped from
danger. To follow this view is to accept the world as we find it and
anesthetize the impulse to existential activity. A good example of this
is the Kitty Genovese case24 in New York City, where 38 persons
watched a woman being slowly murdered in front of their houses; none
of them tried to help or even call a policeman. This tendency to accept
tragedy is probably heightened by the fact that we are continually
exposed to wars, riots, floods and famine accompanied by the moder-
ate tones of television commentators who offer unimpassioned polit-
ical analysis or cold statistics. There is less of a sense of tragedy in
the treatment of these disasters than in the coverage of a champion-
ship boxing bout. If we translate Jaspers' view of tragedy to the living
drama of the courtroom, 25 we see that for the judge to look back to
the past for a decision allows him to become remote from the con-
flict before him and to renounce a unique opportunity for communica-
tion.
While the sociological school of jurisprudence would also avoid
blind obedience to precedent, their orientation would not be any more
satisfying to Jaspers because they view the individual as a "social
22. K. JASPERS, TRAGEDY IS NOT ENOUGH 75 (1953).
23. Id. at 80.
24. See A. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES (1964).
25. In a symposium on the Chicago conspiracy trial and trial disruption, Leonard
B. Boudin stated:
I want to recognize one human element that can not be disregarded, when
defense counsel are involved in a case: as I" see it, not only are they emotionally
involved, but there is an interaction among defense counsel. One of them
necessarily feels'that he wants to hold the stage, which all trial lawyers do,
I hear, and in holding the stage he must do something that his colleague-
other defense counsel, has not done. And then the judge moves in; then the
colleague moves in. So generally speaking, there is this emotional reaction in
which the judge is playing a part, and the only consideration I would suggest
here is: why suddenly decide that this is a political case problem. Why not
decide it is a human problem which affects every lawyer in the trial of every
case.
Symposium-Disruption, Discipline and Due Process, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS 139 (July 1971).
275
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fact ' 26 and thus are not really more open to communication with
him. They tend to view man from the outside as the product of vari-
ous social forces. The existentialist, on the other hand, agrees that man
can be the subject of different kinds of research but realizes that we
can never completely understand him. Sociological jurists tend to lose
sight of the unique, concrete case before them as the individual shrinks
into a mere speck in their social plan. The judge cannot retain his
humanity unless he allows himself (as well as the rest of us) to com-
municate with the accused in the fullest sense. As Jaspers writes, "only
in community with others can I be revealed in the act of mutual
discovery. My own freedom can only exist if the other is also free." 27
When a judge condemns the conduct of political trials on grounds of
decorum or orders a defendant bound and gagged, then he converts
the halls of justice into a mausoleum. Closed courts, like closed philo-
sophical systems, represent a dangerous escape from reality-and from
honesty.
Jean-Paul Sartre offers the most activistic philosophy of all the
existentialists and his theories are even more controversial for law than
for philosophy. He views man as being totally free; his actions cannot
be determined by environment, God, society, heredity or any other
factors. In his famous lecture Existentialism is a Humanism,28 Sartre
proclaims the first principle of his philosophy: man's existence pre-
cedes his essence-"that man first of all exists, encounters himself,
surges up in the world-and defines himself afterwards. '2 Man is con-
stantly making ethical decisions and thus creating himself at each mo-
ment of his existence. Only our actions can determine what we are.
A person's potentiality means nothing unless it is realized in some en-
deavor, such as a work of art or a judicial decision. We cannot say that
John Marshall would decide the Pentagon Papers case in a certain
way; all we can give him credit (or blame) for are the decisions he did
26. See E. DURKHEIi, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1895).
27. Jaspers, On My Philosophy, in KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 147.
28. KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 287.
29. Id. at 290. Although this is generally thought to be the basic tenet of existen-
tialism, Martin Heidegger has taken issue with it in his Letter "On Humanism":
Sartre formulates the basic principle of existentialism in these words: existence
precedes essence. Here he uses the terms existentia and essentia in the old sense
of metaphysics which says since Plato: the essentia precedes the existentia.
Sartre reverses this sentence. But the reversal of a metaphysical sentence re-
mains a metaphysical sentence. Being such a sentence, it remains, like all
metaphysics, in the oblivion of the truth of Being.
KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 37.
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make. "In life, a man commits himself, draws his own portrait and
there is nothing but that portrait." 30 For Sartre there can be no progress
(at least in an ethical sense) because man will always exist in a con-
stantly changing situation and will always be faced with a project,
which necessitates a choice. No values can force us to decide in a cer-
tain way; we must first choose to accept our values. While we always
have the freedom to choose, we do not have the freedom of not
choosing. "Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose."3 1
Sartre not only makes the individual responsible for himself, but
extends this responsibility to include all of mankind. When every
decision one makes becomes a piece of legislation for the whole of
humanity, the person experiences anguish, "the fear and trembling"
that Abraham felt when commanded to kill his son. The fact that
there is no God in Sartre's universe leads to a feeling of abandonment,
that we must consider the consequences of God's absence until the
end of our existence. This philosophy is the antithesis of quietism,
since it requires each man to act upon his values even if he faces in-
surmountable obstacles. No one can create the utopian society he en-
visions, but he can act towards that goal, without any illusions of suc-
cess or expectations of help from others.
II. PORTRAIT OF THE STRICT CONSTRUCTIONIST
Since existentialism may be viewed as a revolt against traditional
philosophy, it is only appropriate that we utilize its basic approach to
attack traditional legal ideas. In this section we shall analyze the views
of Senator Sam Ervin, a self-avowed strict constructionist, not be-
cause he is a particularly important thinker or powerful political fig-
ure, but because his misconceptions are very commonly held and, as
we shall show, have their roots in several more respectable legal
theorists. Thus, this section is essentially an act of unmasking-that
is, unmasking in order to change32 -and will make special use of the
philosophy of Sartre, who is most adept at tearing the veil off self-
deception.- In attempting to develop an existential theory of constitu-
tional law, we have to modify Sartre's assertion that the individual
is the creator of all his values to include an acceptance of the Constitu-
30. Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, in W. KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 300.
31. J.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 481 (Philosophical Lib. ed. 1956).
32. See M. BURNIER, CHOICE OF ACTION: THE FRENCH EXISTENTIALISTS ON THE
POLITICAL LINE (1968).
33. See J.P. SARTRE, supra note 31, at 47-70.
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tion and its principles. This is not necessarily inconsistent with that
philosophy since its values are not so much concerned with the con-
tent of our decisions as with the manner in which they are reached;
and if Sartre can mix Marx with his existentialism, we may justifiably
mix Madison with ours.
In Role of the Supreme Court: Policymaker or Adjudicator?4
Senator Ervin espouses a philosophy of strict constructionism, which
he uses to attack the Warren Court. He begins his argument by
explaining that the Founding Fathers did not want the Supreme
Court to be an advisory body with the power to veto acts it deemed
unwise. This policymaking power was delegated to the federal
and state legislatures, but was usurped by the Warren Court. "Lib-
erty," he writes, "cannot exist except under a government of laws .... 35
He quotes Woodrow Wilson as warning of the dangers of concen-
trating too much power in the federal government, since this
leads to the destruction of civil liberties. The local authorities in the
states are much closer to the needs of the people than the federal gov-
ernment and their vital reserved powers have been destroyed by the
Warren Court. The Founding Fathers were aware of the need for
change and made provision for this by the amendment process. He
urges judges to exercise self-restraint to stay within the judicial power;
the extent of this power is to ascertain the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, not to rewrite it. Where the language of the Constitution is
ambiguous, he argues, the Court must place itself in the position of
the framers and ratifiers and interpret these provisions according to
their language and history. Until the Warren Court began stretch-
ing the legislative powers of Congress beyond constitutional limits,
the Supreme Court had been faithful to the dream of the Founding
Fathers. Ervin's analysis is interspersed with quotations from Wash-
ington, Webster, Brandeis, Madison and other important figures of
the past. Though he is critical of many decisions of the Warren Court,
his tone is always moderate and hopeful for the future:
It is obvious to those who love the Constitution and are willing to
face naked reality that the Warren Court took giant strides down the
road of usurpation, and that if the course set by it is not reversed, the
dream of the Founding Fathers will vanish and the most precious lib-
34. S. ERVIN & R. CLARK, ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT: POLICYMAKER OR
ADJUDICATOR? (1970) [hereinafter cited as ERVIN].
35. Id. at 2.
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erty of the people-the right to constitutional government-will
perish.8 6
Strict construction, he asserts, requires fidelity to the Constitution. The
Court is required to apply the Constitution and laws according to their
"true meaning," 87 regardless of whether the individual judges approve
of them. He also warns of the danger of losing the states as "labora-
tories for experiments in government." 38
The beginning of Ervin's argument is sound historically: the
framers of the Constitution did not want the Supreme Court to act
as a council of revision to advise the legislature as to which acts were
acceptable to them. 9 However, from this he jumps to the conclusion
that the Warren Court has usurped the policymaking power that
belongs to the legislature. This shows an inadequate understanding of
the proper role of the judiciary in this country. In 1835 Alexis de
Tocqueville, our most perceptive visitor, wrote concerning this
question:
[The stranger to this country] hears the authority of a judge invoked
in the political occurrences of every day, and he naturally concludes
that, in the United States, the judges are important political func-
tionaries: nevertheless, when he examines the nature of the tribunals,
they offer at the first glance nothing which is contrary to the usual
habits and privileges of these bodies; and the magistrates seem to him
to interfere in public affairs only by chance, but by a chance which
recurs every day .... 4
0
Thus, while Ervin is correct in stating that the courts cannot advise
Congress as to the constitutionality of an uncontested law, once a proper
case is brought, the Court must pronounce judgment upon the law
as applied to that case. Tocqueville realized that American judges
have great political power because they have the right to base their
decisions upon the Constitution rather than statutory enactments and
are in fact "not permitted... to apply such laws as may appear to them
unconstitutional."' 4 1 This judicial power, though significant, is still es-
sentially passive in nature because a judge cannot initiate a proceeding
on his own but must wait for the case to be brought before him. When
36. Id. at 14. The title of this section is "Saving the Constitution."
37. Id. at 73.
38. Id. at 84.
39. Id. at 1.
40. A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 73 (R. Heffner ed. 1956).
41. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
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the policies of a state or federal government conflict with an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights, the court is obligated to hear the case,
consider the interests involved and decide one way or the other.
Ervin spends much time arguing that liberty only exists under a
government of laws and that judges are forbidden to consider their
personal ideas about what is right and wrong in making their deci-
sions. Following this line of reasoning, he writes:
The power to make policy is discretionary in nature. It involves the
making of choices on the basis of expediency or prudence among
alternative ways of acting.
The power to make policy in a government of laws resides with
those who are authorized to participate in the lawmaking process
[the legislature]. 42
The first weakness of this analysis is that it views the Constitution as
something that is "knowable in itself," as if the language of the Constitu-
tion is unambiguous and provides ready answers for all possible cases.
While it is clear, for example, that each state is entitled to two sena-
tors, what about the due process clause? or the equal protection
clause? Is their meaning clear? Which rights are protected by the
ninth amendment? Can there be one "true meaning" for each of these
questions that those "who love the Constitution" can offer us? Ervin
views the judge as a computer that is bound by its program or a bird
in a Skinnerian cage that must press the right levers to receive its re-
ward. For him the law is like Sartre's example of the paper knife4
whose essence is predetermined by the artisan who creates it. If it had
been the intention of the Founding Fathers to constrict the judiciary
with such unrealistic ideas, the American legal system would probably
have died stillborn. However, the framers of the Constitution possessed
more foresight than Ervin realizes (or wishes to admit). The leaders
of the Revolutionary War were influenced by the theories of John
Locke and of the French Enlightenment and as a result believed in
natural law. Even the austere John Adams could refer in 1765 in a
Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law to rights that were
"antecedent to all earthly government,-Rights, that cannot be repealed
or restrained by human laws-Rights, derived from the great Legis-
lator of the universe." 44
42. ERVIN, supra note 34, at 5 (emphasis added).
43. Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, in W. IAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 289-90.
44. ESSENTIAL WORKS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 7 (paper ed. 1964).
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During the early years of the Republic, courts frequently made
references to these natural rights. In the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull,
Justice Chase wrote:
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority.45
This idea was also expressed before ratification by Alexander Hamilton
in The Federalist Papers where he argued against the necessity of in-
cluding a bill of rights in the Constitution, not because these rights
were unimportant, but because their enumeration was unnecessary
and even dangerous.
They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext
to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not
be done which there is no power to do?46
James Madison tried to provide a protection from the dangers of
"strict constructionism" by the introduction of the ninth amendment.
In presenting this amendment he said:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow,
by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were in-
tended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government,
and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible
arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of
rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the ...
[ninth amendment]. 47
It is clear then that these basic rights that legislatures cannot in-
fringe are not clearly stated and are, in fact, kept intentionally ambigu-
ous in the text of the Constitution. These rights have no preconceived
essence; they are not an a priori whole that can be reduced to scien-
tific formulas and deduced rationally. They must be "brought to con-
sciousness [by the judge] out of a basis which is now experienced and
out of a content still unclearly willed."48 In providing us with certain
45. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 89, at 579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
47. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 456 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834).
48. K. JASPERS, supra note 5, at 48.
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minimum liberties, the Bill of Rights does not stop at any determinate
point but creates an open-ended system. Since the very nature of the
American Revolution is still not completely understood, it is impos-
sible to state definitively which rights the ninth amendment refers to.40
Are they rights of common law or of nature? If the latter, are they nat-
ural rights with a fixed or variable content? Kierkegaard's statement
concerning the "true meaning" of history is appropriate:
The historical material is infinite, and the imposition of a limit must
therefore in one way or another be arbitrary. Although the historical
material belongs to the past, it is as subject for cognition not com-
plete; it is constantly coming into being through new observations and
inquiries, new discoveries are constantly brought to light, compelling
not only additions but also revisions."
This is not a justification for judicial arbitrariness or irrationality but
only means that when the judge chooses from the "seething cauldron of
possibilities" 51 he does so with the knowledge that history cannot in
itself motivate his choice and that he is required to decide with "good
faith."
The thrust of Ervin's argument becomes clear when he warns of
the dangers of concentrating too much power in the federal govern-
ment. The danger of this tendency, he tells us, is that it leads to the
destruction of civil liberties. The local authorities are closer to us
and better aware of our needs. "What the Warren Court has done to
the powers allotted or reserved to the states by the Constitution," he
writes, "beggars description. ' 52 The image of orthodoxy is carefully
constructed by citing many important statesmen of the American
past. He speaks of protecting rights as if he were a civil libertarian-
a defender of the democratic faith. It is only when he attacks specific
decisions that the mask is pierced and his meaning becomes unmis-
takable. The "revolutionary" decisions he complains of are: (1)
Keyishian v. Board of Regents53 (disallowing the state from denying
Communists the right to employment as teachers in state educational
49. See Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its Implica-
tions for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487 (1966), for an excellent article rejecting existentialism
for a civil law approach.
50. S. KiERKEAARD, supra note 14, at 134.
51. K. JASPERS, supra note 5, at 49.
52. ERVIN, supra note 34, at 11.
53. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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institutions) ; (2) United States v. Robe154 (disallowing Congress the
power to deny Communists the right to employment in defense in-
dustries) ; (3) Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Val-
ley Plaza 5 (defending the right of union members to picket on the
employer's property); (4) Miranda v. Arizona56 (protecting the right
of self-incrimination of the accused while in custody by the police) ;
(5) Escobedo v. Illinois57 (protecting a criminal suspect's right to
counsel); and (6) Jones v. Mayer Co., 58 (prohibiting discrimination
against blacks in the sale or rental of property). In all these cases the
Court was merely protecting constitutional rights of free speech, right
to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, etc. Thus, it is not the
danger to civil liberties that Ervin is concerned with, but the Supreme
Court's protection of these rights from infringement by the states. His
argument then becomes one of mauvaise foi or "bad faith" because
it involves a careful attempt to escape from the truth at every turn. The
roots of Ervin's arguments are not in Madison or Marshall as he claims,
but in John Calhoun and the theorists of nullification. It is an attempt
not to "save the Constitution" but to return to state's rights; to resur-
rect the "unjust political power relations" of the past in order to pre-
vent blacks from acquiring property or to prevent Communists from
teaching in public schools. Ervin would have us read the Constitution
as beginning with "we the states" rather than "we the people." In this
way federalism becomes not a means to divide powers between the
federal and state governments, but a tool for the oppression of
minorities.
While there may be a tendency to dismiss Senator Ervin's argu-
ment as insignificant political rhetoric, many of the ideas he utilizes
have been placed at his disposal by the academically respectable opin-
ions of Justice Frankfurter. The late Justice's theory of abstention can
can be seen in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 59 which involved
the constitutionality of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission
requiring all sleeping cars to be in charge of Pullman conductors, who
were all white. Pullman porters, who were all black, filed suit in the
federal court claiming that the order discriminated against them in
54. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
55. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
58. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
59. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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violation of their fourteenth amendment right of equal protection.
Justice Frankfurter declared that the doctrine of abstention required
the case to be brought up first in the state courts of Texas, because
if the supreme court of that state decided that the Commission's
assumption of authority was unwarranted, the constitutional issue
would not arise. Under this doctrine courts "'exercising a wise discre-
tion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary."60 The danger of this theory is that
it places federal etiquette toward the state courts before the rights of
the individual who may be crushed beneath this judicial torpor. As
Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring opinion in England v.
Louisiana State Board:0 '
[I]nstances where Negroes assert their rights in judicial proceedings
• ..will be civil ones and most always instituted in the Federal Dis-
trict Courts, since those courts have a special competence in the field
and a record of independence protective of the rights of unpopular
miorities .... Under the Pullman doctrine a Negro who starts in the
federal court soon finds himself in the state court and his journey there
may be not only weary and expensive but also long and drawn out.
... The whole weight of the status quo will be on the side of delay
and procrastination.62
Justice Frankfurter's doctrine of abstention accommodates itself well
to Ervin's purposes, as the latter's advocation of the slow amendment
process as the only proper means of making any change in the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision makes clear.
Justice Frankfurter's attitude of judicial "self-restraint" also fur-
thers the cause of Senator Ervin. Dennis v. United States3 involved a
conviction for violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act
because the defendants had organized to teach themselves and others
Marxist-Leninist doctrines. In his concurring opinion affirming the
conviction, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized
when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume
primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, eco-
nomic and social pressures.
60. Id. at 501.
61. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
62. Id. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
63. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of interests
which this case presents were the primary responsibility for reconcil-
ing it ours.6 4
This view of the judicial function is not consistent with existentialism
or with the views of Hamilton and Madison in the Federalist Papers.
It is an attempt to abdicate the adjudicatory role in a proper case
because an unpopular minority is being persecuted during a period of
national hysteria. The paradox of the judge who does not want to
judge is-like Kierkegaard's example of the man who wills to be a
bird-ridiculous. 5 As Sartre has pointed out, one cannot choose not
to choose. When Justice Frankfurter refuses to judge the case, he does
not make the judiciary independent of the hysteria but chooses to
join the witchhunt by sanctioning the law. As Tocqueville made
clear:
[The judge] only judges the law because he is obliged to judge a case.
The political question which he is called upon to resolve is connected
with the interests of the parties, and he cannot refuse to decide it
without a denial of justice .... Within these limits, the power vested
in the American courts of justice, of pronouncing a statute to be
unconstitutional, forms one of the most powerful barriers which has
ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies.66
The justification for this judicial abdication is often made on the
grounds that it is "'abdication' in favor of 'the exhilarating adventure
of a free people determining its own destiny.' "67 However, the mean-
ing of the Bill of Rights is that there are certain limitations uipon the
types of experiments that the states or the federal government can
'make. For example, the government is denied the power to experiment
with the establishment of a religion or the elimination of free speech.
Although Justice Frankfurter was highly literate and humane, the
aloofness of his legal philosophy led him to repeatedly condone vio-
•lations of basic civil liberties.' If, as Sartre says, a man's actions deter-
mine his own portrait, then the self-portrait that Justice Frankfurter
has painted contains some unseemly blemishes.
While describing those thinkers who influenced him, Karl Jaspers
wrote: "[I]n his basic philosophic attitude, although not in his con-
64. Id. at 525.
65. S. KIERKEGAARD, supra note 14, at 109.
66. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 40, at 76 (emphasis added).
67. Mendelson, Introduction to FELIX FRANKFURTER, A TRIBUTE at 4 (1964).
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crete positions, Plato is as alive today as ever .... ."8 For Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes the reverse seems true; the concrete positions he took
were often far superior to his philosophic attitude-and Justice Frank-
furter seems to have been influenced by the wrong part. In Lochner
v. New York,6 9 the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute
which prohibited employment in a bakery for more than sixty hours
in one week or ten hours in one day. Justice Peckham, who delivered
the majority opinion, made the unforgettable statement that
[t]here is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this
to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public
health, or the health of the individuals who are following the trade
of a baker.70
Justice Holmes dissented, reaching the proper conclusion that the
law should have been upheld, but justified his decision by stating
that "[a] reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score
of health." 71 Following this approach, Justice Frankfurter accepted
almost any legislation that seemed reasonable without actively weigh-
ing the evidence to balance the conflicting interests of the individual
and the state. For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,7 2 he dissented on the grounds that the action of a state
board of education requiring public school pupils to salute the flag
of the United States in violation of their religious beliefs should have
been held constitutional. The fact that there was no strong public
purpose, such as existed in cases involving vaccination, did not seem
to matter to Justice Frankfurter. He wrote, "We are dealing with
matters as to which legislators and voters have conflicting views. Are
we as judges to impose our strong convictions on where wisdom lies?"78
The proper answer to this question is revealed by a study of Justice
Harlan's opinion in Lochner. Justice Harlan's opinion manifests a
respect for the prerogative of the legislature that stops considerably
short of Justice Frankfurter's reverence. He does not accept the law
as reasonable merely upon its face as Justice Holmes did, but cites
evidence from a treatise on diseases that afflict workers to show the
special health hazards to bakers. Then after finding "weighty, substan-
68. Jaspers, On My Philosophy, in W. KAUFMANN, supra note 4, at 137.
69. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
70. Id. at 58.
71. Id. at 76.
72. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
73. Id. at 665.
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tial" reasons for supporting the statute, he decides that it is a constitu-
tional exercise of the legislative authority. This approach is consis-
tent with existential theory because the judge is considering all the
unique factors in the case with care and honesty and without depend-
ing upon the weight of precedent or any inflexible formulas.
The basic view that Senator Ervin has elicited from Frankfurter,
Holmes and others is that where the legislature has acted or where
there is a settled line of precedent, the judge should exercise self-re-
straint and eliminate his own feelings from the decision. As Justice
Frankfurter stated in Barnette, "It can never be emphasized too much
that one's own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a law should be
excluded altogether when one is doing one's duty on the bench. ' 74 But
can the judge separate himself from the results of his decision? Is there
a justification for "scientific" legal method that results in decisions the
judge considers immoral? Hans Kelsen, the theorist of the Pure Theory
of Law, would answer in the affirmative. In The General Theory of
Law and State75 he wrote, "Judgments of justice cannot be tested
objectively. Therefore a science of law has no room for them. ' 76 This
positivistic theory attempts to "purify" the law by separating the phi-
losophy of justice, as well as sociology, from legal theory: "As a theory,
its sole purpose is to know its subject. It answers the question of what
the law is, not what it ought to be. The latter question is one of poli-
tics, while the pure theory of law is science."' 77 Anthony Blackshield
is of the opinion that Kierkegaard's attack upon the Hegelian system
can be easily applied to the Kelsenite system, since the latter also seeks
to be universally valid and to incorporate the possibility of movement
within its structure.78 Kelsen's theory, in not differentiating between
political systems, whether English, Nazi, etc., leaves itself open to
criticism on moral grounds. Since the Nuremberg Trials are the
specter that haunts this generation and the American system of "justice"
is currently under fierce attack,70 it is relevant to consider the mean-
ing of those trials in the light of our analysis. Since the Trials held
individuals responsible for acts which were not crimes under German
law when committed, the judgments were criticized as operating ex
74. Id. at 647.
75. H. KELSEN, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945).
76. Id. at 49.
77. H. KELSEN, WHAT IS.JUSTICE? 266 (1957).
78. Blackshield, supra note 2, at 101.
79. See LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE
COURTS (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971).
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post facto and as manifesting nothing but "a show of crude, irresponsi-
ble force"80 by the victors. The legal positivists claimed that the de-
fenses of "act of state" and "order of superior" should have been suffi-
cient to create legal immunity.8' One view of the dangers resulting
from the Nuremberg decisions was that
[these] principles if generally accepted may reduce the unity of the
state, increase the difficulties of maintaining domestic order, and deter
statesmen from pursuing vigorous foreign policies when necessary
in the national interests.82
It is just such disruption that is advocated here-to prevent members
of the military or the legal system from claiming sanctuary from re-
sponsibility in the orders of superiors or the acts of the legislature
or past decisions. Before a pilot drops a bomb on a Vietnamese village
or a judge upholds a bigoted statute, he must be made aware of his
freedom at that moment, to feel a sense of anguish because like Abra-
ham there is an Isaac beneath his blade. As Sartre has written in
Being and Nothingness:3
The most terrible situations of war, the worst tortures do not create a
non-human state of things; there is no non-human state of things;
there is no non-human situation. It is only through fear, flight and
recourse to magical types of conduct that I shall decide on the non-
human, but this decision is human, and I shall carry the entire re-
sponsibility for it.s4
It is the purpose of an existential theory of law to refuse to allow the
judge or the lawyer to renounce his humanity; if Nietzsche could say
that Christianity destroyed Pascal,85 we may conclude that the philoso-
phy of judicial self-restraint had a similar effect upon Justice Frank-
furter. If the subjectivity of existentialism seems to leave us at the
mercy of each judge's moral sense, we must remember the lesson of
the legal realists that through the power of "broad" or "narrow" in-
terpretation we are already at his mercy. All existentialism can do is
remind him that his choice should be made with openness, good faith
80. W. BoscH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMIBERG 45 (1970).
81. Id. at 52.
82. Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 38, 45 (1947).
83. J.P. SARTE, supra note 31.
84. Id. at 554.
85. See CRITIQUF, supra note 10, at 126.
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and an awareness of his freedom. As we have seen in such cases as
Dred Scott,8 6 Plessy v. Ferguson,8 7 and Sacco-Vanzetti,8 8 once the moral
universe within the judge flickers out the positive law may survive-
but for that moment justice is dead.
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